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Patrick DEHORNOY
Abstract. Conjugacy is not the only possible primitive for designing braid-
based protocols. To illustrate this principle, we describe a Fiat–Shamir-style
authentication protocol that be can be implemented using any binary operation
that satisfies the left self-distributive law. Conjugation is an example of such an
operation, but there are other examples, in particular the shifted conjugation
on Artin’s braid group B∞, and the finite Laver tables. In both cases, the
underlying structures have a high combinatorial complexity, and they lead to
difficult problems.
Most of the braid-based cryptographic schemes proposed so far [1, 18, 3] rely
on the supposed complexity of the conjugation operation in Artin’s braid groups.
In this note, we would like to stress the fact that conjugation is by far not the only
possible primitive operation for designing braid-based protocols.
To illustrate this general idea on a concrete example, we shall discuss an au-
thentication scheme directly reminiscent of the Fiat–Shamir scheme, and a variant
of some scheme considered in [20] in the case of braids. We show that such a
scheme can be implemented naturally in every algebraic system that involves a
binary operation that satisfies the algebraic law x(yz) = (xy)(xz), called (left) self-
distributivity. Conjugation on any group is an example of such an operation, but
there are other examples, in particular the operation that we call shifted conjuga-
tion on Artin’s braid group B∞. There are reasons to think that sfifted conjuga-
tion is (much) more complicated than standard conjugation, and it could provide
a promising alternative primitive for braid-based cryptography.
We also mention the Laver tables, which provide other examples of self-distribu-
tive operations, this time on a finite underlying domain of size 2n. Again, these
combinatorially very complex structures could provide a valuable platform.
1. A Fiat–Shamir-like authentication scheme
Here we start with the general principle of the Fiat–Shamir authentication
scheme, and show that, under rather natural hypotheses, it can be implemented in
any algebraic system involving a self-distributive binary operation.
1.1. The general principle. Let us start with an arbitrary set S, and try
to construct an authentication scheme using the elements of S. To this end, we
assume that a function Fs of S into itself is attached to each element of S and that
there exist efficiently sampleable distributions on S such that, provided s and p
are chosen according to them, the probability that s can be retrieved from the pair
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(p, Fs(p)) in feasible running time is negligible. Under such hypotheses, we can use
s as a private key, and (p, Fs(p)) as a public key.
A natural idea for designing an authentication scheme is to let the prover ap-
peal to a second, auxiliary (random) key r, and use Fr(s) as a disguised version
of s. What we need for a Fiat–Shamir-like authentication scheme is a commit-
ment of the verifier guaranteeing that r is fixed, and an equality witnessing that
Fr(s) is connected in some way to s, via the commitment of the prover. As the
elements p and Fs(p) are public, it is natural to use Fr(p) and/or Fr(Fs(p)) as the
commitment(s) of the prover. Indeed, the assumption that x cannot be retrieved
from (y, Fx(y)), which is already needed for (p, Fs(p)), automatically guarantees
that r cannot be retrieved from the commitments of the prover.
Then what we need is some equality connecting x = Fr(p), y = Fr(Fs(p)), and
s—in a way that heavily involves s, i.e., in such a way that the probability for
another s˜ to give rise to the same equality is negligible. A simple, but very partic-
ular, solution is to require that Fs and Fr commute: in this case, the connection
between x and y is just y = Fs(x). This situation is essentially that considered
in [21, 18], and it is not suitable in the current framework as the verifier would
have to know the secret s.
A more general and flexible solution is to require that Fr(Fs(p)) be connected
to Fr(p) and s by some relation of the form Fr(Fs(p)) = Gr,s(Fr(p)) for some new
function Gr,s. A not so special case is when Gr,s is itself of the form Fg(r,s) where
g is some mapping of S × S into S: considering such a case is natural, because it
avoids introducing a new family of functions and it enables one to work with the
functions (Fs)s∈S solely. For the same reason, it is natural to consider the case
when g(r, s) is defined in terms of the F -functions, typically g(r, s) = Fr(s). This
leads to requiring that the functions Fs satisfy the condition
(1.1) Fr(Fs(p)) = FFr(s)(Fr(p)),
and to use this equality for proving authentication.
1.2. An authentication scheme. The previous analysis leads to considering
the following authentication scheme.
We assume that S is a set and (Fs)s∈S is a family of functions of S to itself that
satisfies Condition (1.1). Then the public keys are a pair (p, p′) of elements of S
satisfying p′ = Fs(p), while s is Alice’s private key. The authentication procedure
consists in repeating k times the following three exchanges:
A chooses r in S, and sends the commitments x = Fr(p) and
x′ = Fr(p
′);
B chooses a random bit c and sends it to A;
For c = 0, A sends y = r, and B checks x = Fy(p) and x
′ =
Fy(p
′);
For c = 1, A sends y = Fr(s), and B checks x
′ = Fy(x).
The correctness of the scheme directly follows from Condition (1.1). Its security
relies on the following assumptions:
(i) It is impossible to retrieve s from the pair (p, Fs(p)), and, more generally,
it is impossible to find s˜ satisfying Fs(p) = Fs˜(p); similar assertions hold for the
pairs (p, Fr(p)), (p
′, Fr(p
′)), and (Fr(p), Fr(p
′));
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(ii) It is impossible to deduce s from Fr(s) when r is unknown.
1.3. Self-distributive operations. Specifying an S-indexed family of map-
pings of a set S into itself amounts to specifying a binary operation on S, namely
the operation ∗ defined by x∗y = Fx(y). Conversely, (Fs)s∈S is the family of all left
translations for (S, ∗). Now, in terms of the operation ∗, Condition (1.1) becomes
(1.2) r ∗ (s ∗ p) = (r ∗ s) ∗ (r ∗ p),
i.e., it asserts that the operation ∗ satisfies the left self-distributivity law, usually
denoted (LD) [6].
Definition 1.1. A set equipped with a binary operation satisfying (1.2) is
called an it LD-system.
Translating the previous authentication scheme into the language of LD-systems
yields the following version.
Assume that (S, ∗) is an LD-system. The public keys are a pair (p, p′) of
elements of S satisfying p′ = s∗p, while s is Alice’s private key. The authentication
procedure consists in repeating k times the following three exchanges:
A chooses r in S, and sends the commitments x = r ∗ p and
x′ = r ∗ p′;
B chooses a random bit c and sends it to A;
For c = 0, A sends y = r, and B checks x = y ∗p and x′ = y ∗p′;
For c = 1, A sends y = r ∗ s, and B checks x′ = y ∗ x.
2. LD-systems
The algebraic platforms eligible for implementing the scheme of Section 1 are
LD-systems, and we are led to reviewing the existing examples of such algebraic
systems.
2.1. Classical examples. A trivial example of an LD-system is given by an
arbitrary set S equipped with the operation x ∗ y = y, or, more generally,
x ∗ y = f(y),
where f is any map of S into itself. Such examples are clearly not relevant for the
scheme of Section 1, as the secret s plays no role in the computation.
The most classical example of an LD-system is provided by a group G equipped
with the conjugacy operation
x ∗ y = xyx−1.
When G is a non-abelian group for which the conjugacy problem is sufficiently
difficult, G is relevant for the scheme of Section 1, and, more generally, for the
various schemes based on the Conjugacy Search Problem such as those of [21, 18]
or [1]. Typical platform groups that have been much discussed in this context are
Artin’s braid groups Bn; in particular, the specific scheme considered in Section 1
is, in the case of the group Bn, (a variant of a scheme) proposed by H. Sibert in his
PhD thesis [20].
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2.2. The shifted conjugacy of braids. Now, and this is the point we wish
to emphasize here, examples of LD-system of a very different flavour exist.
Those LD-systems are connected with free LD-systems, i.e., LD-systems that
satisfy no other relations than those resulting from self-distributivity itself. It is
easy to understand that a group equipped with conjugacy, even a free group, is not
a free LD-system: indeed, the conjugacy operation always satisfies (among others)
the idempotency law x ∗ x = x, and the latter is not a consequence of (LD), as
shows the existence of non-idempotent LD-system such as the integers equipped
with x ∗ y = y + 1.
Actually, free LD-systems are quite complicated objects, and we refer to [6],
which contains an extensive description. For our purpose, it will be enough to know
that, for some deep reasons that need not be explained here, there exists a simple
self-distributive operation on Artin’s braid group B∞ that includes many copies of
the free LD-system with one generator. Let us first recall the definition [2, 6]:
Definition 2.1 (braid group). For n > 2, Artin’s braid group Bn is defined to
be the group with presentation
(2.1) 〈σ1, ..., σn−1 ; σiσj = σjσi for |i− j| > 2, σiσjσi = σjσiσj for |i− j| = 1〉.
For each n, the identity mapping on {σ1, ..., σn−1} induces an embedding of Bn
into Bn+1, so that the groups Bn naturally arrange into an inductive system of
groups, and the limit is denoted by B∞: this is just the group generated by an
infinite family σ1, σ2, ... subject to the relations (2.1).
Lemma 2.2. Let d be the shift mapping of the sequence (σ1, σ2, ...), i.e., the
function mapping σi to σi+1 for each i. Then d induces an injective morphism
of B∞ into itself.
Proof (sketch). As the relations of (2.1) are invariant under shifting the
indices, d induces a well-defined endomorphism of B∞. That this endomorphism
is injective follows from the interpretation of the elements of B∞ in terms of braid
diagrams [2, 6]: the geometric operation of deleting the leftmost strand is then
well-defined, and it enables one to deduce x = y from dx = dy. 
The main notion is then the following.
Definition 2.3 (shifted conjugacy). For x, y in B∞, we put
(2.2) x ∗ y = x · dy · σ1 · dx
−1.
The above operation is a skew version of conjugation: y appears in the middle,
and it is surrounded by x and x−1; the difference with ordinary conjugation lies in
the introduction of the shift d, and of the generator σ1. The reader can check the
equalities
1 ∗ 1 = σ1, 1 ∗ σ1 = σ2σ1, σ1 ∗ 1 = σ
2
1σ
−1
2 , σ1 ∗ σ1 = σ2σ1,
which show that shifted conjugation is quite different from conjugation.
Proposition 2.4. [4, 6] The system (B∞, ∗) is an LD-system. Moreover,
every braid generates under ∗ a free sub-LD-system.
Checking that the operation defined in (2.2) satisfies the LD law is an easy
verification. In the context of groups, the property that every element generates a
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free subgroup is torsion-freeness. Thus Proposition 2.4 expresses that (B∞, ∗) is in
some sense a torsion-free LD-system.
Understanding why the weird definition of shifted conjugacy has to appear
requires a rather delicate analysis which is the main subject of the book [6]. It
can be observed that, once the definition (2.2) is used, braids inevitably appear.
Indeed, if we assume that G is a group, that f is an endomorphism of G, and that
a is a fixed element of G, then defining
x ∗ y = x f(y) a f(x)−1
yields a left self-distributive operation (if and) only if the subgroup of G generated
by the elements fn(a) is a homomorphic image of Artin’s braid group B∞, i.e., up
to an isomorphism, it is B∞ or a quotient of the latter group.
2.3. Discussion. Our intuition is that the LD-system (B∞, ∗), i.e., braids
equipped with shifted conjugacy, might be a promising platform for implementing
the scheme of Section 1—or, more generally, for implementing any scheme based
on a left self-distributive operation. This intuition ought to be confirmed by an
experimental evidence, which at this early stage is not yet available. Here we
content ourselves with a few remarks about the respective properties of conjugacy
and shifted conjugacy in B∞.
First, note that in general using free structures does not seem a very good idea
in cryptography, as by definition the free structures are those in which the least
possible number of equalities are satisfied, a not very good framework for hiding
things. That is why, for instance, a free LD-system would probably not be the
optimal platform for implementing the scheme of Section 1. However, the LD-
system (B∞, ∗) is far from being free, and it is even conjectured that it contains no
free LD-system with two generators. For instance, the equality σ1 ∗ σ1 = σ2 ∗ σ2
(= σ2σ1) shows that the sub-LD-system generated by σ1 and σ2 is not free. No
presentation of (B∞, ∗) as an LD-system is known.
Practically, using shifted conjugacy of braids as suggested here relies on the
difficulty of the following problem, which is analogous to the Conjugacy Search
Problem:
Shifted Conjugacy Seach Problem: Assuming that s, p are
braids in B∞ and p
′ = s ∗ p holds, find a braid s˜ satisfying
p′ = s˜ ∗ p.
Contrary to the Conjugacy Seach Problem, no solution to the Shifted Conjugacy
Search Problem is known so far. It is not even known whether the simple Shifted
Conjugacy Problem is decidable, i.e., whether one can effectively decide for two
braids p, p′ the existence of s satisfying p′ = s∗p. It is likely that shifted conjugacy
is quite different from ordinary conjugacy, and that none of the many specific results
established for the latter [14, 11, 15] extends to shifted conjugacy. In particular,
we see no simple strategy for constructing the “shifted super summit set” of a
braid p, defined as the family of all shifted conjugates of p with minimal canonical
length—which is the key point in all solutions to the Conjugacy Problem known so
far.
However, it is fair to mention that the Shifted Conjugacy Search Problem, which
should not be threatened by specific attacks against the Conjugacy Search Problem
[16, 19], remains, as the latter, an instance of the general Decomposition Problem
and, as such, it is not a priori immune against length-based attacks [17, 12, 13].
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To emphasize the difference between ordinary and shifted conjugations, we
point
Proposition 2.5 ([5], Corollary 1.8). The mapping f : s 7→ s ∗ 1 is injective.
In the case of ordinary conjugacy, every conjugate of 1 is 1, so the above
injective function f is replaced with the constant function with value 1. By the
way, very little is known about f . In particular, we raise
Question 2.6. Starting with a braid p, find s satisfying s ∗ 1 = p (when it
exists).
Once more, nothing is known. This might suggest to use f as a possible one-way
function on braids.
3. The Laver tables and other algebraic systems
To conclude, we mention that braids are not the only possible platform for
implementing self-distributive operations—and that the self-distributivity law is
not even the only algebraic law eligible for the approach sketched in Section 1.
3.1. The Laver tables. Instead of resorting to an infinite LD-system like B∞
equipped with shifted conjugacy, one could instead use finite LD-systems. Such
algebraic systems are far from being completely understood, but there exists an
infinite sequence of so-called Laver tables that plays a fundamental role among
LD-systems—similar to the role of the cyclic groups Z/pZ among finite abelian
groups—and, at the same time, has a high combinatorial complexity.
We refer to Chapter X of [6] for details. For our current overview, it is enough
to mention that, for each nonnegative integer n, there exists a unique LD-system An
such that the underlying set is the 2n elements interval {0, 1, ..., 2n − 1} and one
has p ∗ 0 = p + 1 for 0 6 p 6 2n − 2 and 2n − 1 ∗ 0 = 0. The value of p ∗ q in An
can be easily computed using a double induction on q increasing from 0 to 2n − 1
and for p decreasing from 2n − 1 to 0, using the rule
p ∗ (q + 1) = (p ∗ q) ∗ (p ∗ 0),
and observing that p ∗ q has to be always strictly larger than p. Table 2 displays
the first four Laver tables.
A0 0
0 0
A1 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
A2 0 1 2 3
0 1 3 1 3
1 2 3 2 3
2 3 3 3 3
3 0 1 2 3
A3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 1 3 5 7 1 3 5 7
1 2 3 6 7 2 3 6 7
2 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7
3 4 5 6 7 4 5 6 7
4 5 7 5 7 5 7 5 7
5 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7
6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Table 1. The Laver tables An with 0 6 n 6 3
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Several general phenomena can be observed on these particular examples. First,
for each n, the table An with 2
n elements is the projection modulo 2n of the ta-
ble An+1 with 2
n+1 elements. In other words, if we use a length n binary repre-
sentation for the elements of An, only the dominant bit of each value has to be
computed in order to determine An+1 from An. Next, every row in the table An
is periodic, with a period that is a power of 2. More precisely, for each p, the row
of p in An consists of 2
k values
r0 = p+ 1 < r1 < ... < r2k−1 = 2
n − 1
repeated 2n−k times. One can show that, if (r0, ..., r2k−1) is the periodic pattern in
the row of p in An, with r0 = p+1 and r2k−1 = 2
n− 1 and if t denotes the smallest
integer for which one has p ∗ t > 2n in An+1, then
- (i) either t = 2k holds, the period of p doubles from 2k to 2k+1 between An
and An+1, and the periodic pattern in An+1 is (r0, ..., r2k−1, r0+2
n, ..., r2k−1+2
n),
- (ii) or 0 6 t < 2k holds, the period of p remains 2k in An+1, and the periodic
pattern in An+1 is (r0, ..., rt−1, rt + 2
n, ..., r2k−1 + 2
n).
In each case, the only piece of information needed to construct the row of p in An+1
from the row of p in An is the value of t, which is called the threshold of p in An, and,
therefore, the list of thresholds suffices to construct An+1 from An (cf. Table 2).
Note that, as An is the projection of An+1, we can consider that we work in the
inverse limit A∞ of the tables An, i.e., we are constructing an LD-operation on
2-adic numbers.
A0 1
−
A1 1 2
0 1
A2 1 2 3 4
1 0 0 2
A3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 2 1 0 0 0 0 4
Table 2. Threshold table for An with 1 6 n 6 3
The reason for mentioning the Laver tables here is that their combinatorial
properties seem to be very complicated. In particular, predicting the values in the
first half of the sequence of thresholds is extremely difficult (the values in the second
half are always 0, ..., 0, 2n): this is witnessed by the results of [8, 9, 10] which
show that fast growing functions are necessarily involved here.
3.2. Central duplication. As a final remark, we come back to the Fiat–
Shamir-like authentication scheme of Section 1. We noted that its security requires
two conditions, namely one that is directly connected with the difficulty of what can
be called the ∗-Search Problem, and the additional requirement that communicating
Fr(s), i.e., r ∗ s, gives no practical information about s when r remains unknown.
Using the latter condition to forge an attack seems unclear, but, at least for aesthetic
reasons, we might like to avoid it. This can be done, at the expense of changing
the algebraic law.
Indeed, instead of communicating Fr(s) in case c = 1 of the authentication
scheme, Alice could communicate Fs(r). In this case, the supposed difficulty of the
∗-Search Problem guarantees that Fs(r) gives no information about s. Now, when
the scheme is modified in this way, the equality checked by the verifier has to be
modified as well. If we keep the same principle, we are led to replace Condition (1.1)
with
(3.1) Fr(Fs(p)) = FFs(r)(Fr(p)).
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When Condition (3.1) is translated into the language of binary operations, we
obtain a new algebraic law, namely
(3.2) r ∗ (s ∗ p) = (s ∗ r) ∗ (r ∗ p),
instead of left self-distributivity. Nothing specific is known about this law so far,
but it should be possible to use the general method explained for a similar law in
[7] to construct concrete examples of algebras that satisfy it.
4. Conclusion
We discussed various non-classical algebraic operations that could possibly be
used as cryptographical primitives, typically for a Fiat–Shamir-like authentication
scheme. The most promising example seems to be the shifted conjugacy operation
on braids. At the least, the existence of such an operation shows that conjugacy
is not the only possible primitive for braid-based cryptography, and that further
investigation in this direction is needed.
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